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This thesis contains an information guide to, and an
economic evaluation of arbitration in the public sector.
The research has resulted in the description of legal rela-
tionships between compulsory arbitration and employee's and
manager's rights. It describes procedures to follow in
selecting an arbitrator and discusses how to prepare and
present an arbitration case. The economic evaluation
defines specific costs and benefits and evaluates the effect
of arbitration on wage and benefits of public employees.
The conclusions provide managers with an evaluation of
the strengths and weaknesses of arbitration in the federal
sector and provide mid-level managers with a guide to the
procedural steps up to and including the arbitration process
Strengths include those benefits derived such as protection
of employee interest, political and social stability, and
inferred public and private wage parity. Weaknesses are
the unmeasurable cost to the tax payer resulting from the
allocating of scarce public resources by non-representative
third party arbitrators. Recommendations are made for
further cost benefit analysis on subjects relating to arbi-
tration in the federal sector.
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The growing reliance in the federal government on arbi-
tration for resolving disputes between labor and management
has been accompanied by numerous debates over the merits of
"binding" or "compulsory" third party settlements (arbitra-
tion) . Some maintain that arbitration removes "precious
freedom" from the bargainers since the essence of binding
arbitration is the imposition of a third party's opinion.
[Morse, 1963] Others argue it to be incompatible with
collective bargaining because of the "narcotic" and "chilling"
effects. [Bloom, 1981] Anon states that arbitration is most-
ly political and that earnings and fringe benefits of public
employees are catching up with and surpassing wages and
benefits of private employees at tax payers' expense. [1975]
The basic aims of this thesis are to examine the costs
and benefits that are derived from arbitration, to determine
if the process and its use is a beneficial and viable con-
cept, and to provide needed information to mid-level
managers about arbitration in general.
It is not always feasible to conduct a complete economic
analysis/program evaluation. However, within the limited
scope of this thesis, selected resources and expenditures
used to achieve arbitration objectives will be investigated.

B . BACKGROUND
The grievance process has generally been accepted as
the means to settle disputes between labor and management.
Most collective bargaining agreements provide machinery for
the purpose of settling disputes arising during the term of
the labor contract. Grievance procedures take many forms,
but ordinarily, the first three or four steps use what is
called "negotiation techniques." These techniques are a
means by which the grievance is carried through the levels
of authority within the federal government and the unions
involved. If these steps of negotiation fail, then the
final level of bargaining, arbitration, is used. At this
point, the parties involved say, "We cannot settle it.
Let's bring in somebody from the outside and have him tell
us what to do. His decision will be final and binding."
Federal unions and their members are becoming more influen-
tial and these unions are becoming very skilled at using the
legally established grievance process to their membership's
benefit. [Updegraff, 1970]
Today's manager must do more than just acquaint himself
with this collective bargaining process because he will be
faced many times with many different types of settlement and
grievance scenarios. As each side becomes more aware of the
power of those rights and laws, some observers believe more
federal cases will go to arbitration. [Loevi , 1978] Despite
10

the growing importance of arbitration, an "evaluation" of
this process has escaped public attention. For example, the
general public does not really understand all the events
leading up to the unsuccessful conclusion of the recent
confrontation between the federal government and the
federally employed air controllers. Even if the arbitration
effort had been successful, the basic question of cost and
reward would not have been publicly announced or published.
There seems to be ample literature on the general subject
matter of arbitration, but there are gaps at the mid-
manager's level and few attempts at program evaluation at
any level.
C. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II of this thesis describes the legal relation-
ships between compulsory arbitration, employee rights,
management rights, and the duties of the federal agencies
and labor organizations involved in ensuring compliance in
those areas. It also briefly discusses the role of the
Federal Service Impasses Panel and exceptions to arbitrator's
awards
.
Chapter III provides an explanation of the process for
selecting an arbitrator to preside over the arbitration
hearing itself. This chapter generally defines the types
of arbitrators and presents pros and cons of those types.
11

Chapter IV deals with the decision to arbitrate or not,
and specifically addresses the question of the "arbitra-
bility" of a grievance issue.
Chapters V and VI discuss how to prepare and present an
arbitration case. These chapters provide a recommended step-
by-step procedure for handling the problems within their
specified area.
Chapter VII evaluates arbitration by setting cost and
benefit criteria in such areas as "protector of employee
interest," "inhibitor of collective bargaining," etc., and
examines the effect of arbitration on wage and fringe
benefits both in the public and private sectors.
Chapter VIII summarizes the conclusion of this research
and makes recommendations for further research.
D. RESEARCH METHODS
Several means of research were employed. The "Guide,"
Chapters II through VI, was derived from research of materials
published and interviews with professional arbitrators.
These were combined to form a comprehensive yet easily
understood explanation of events leading to and during
arbitration.
Chapter VII, the economic analysis and program evalua-
tion, presented quite a few problems, although the problems
associated are not unique to evaluation of public sector
programs. [Gramlich, 1981] Physical yields were used when
12

available and lent no difficulty to this endeavor; the
problem arose when trying to place a quantitative measure-
ment on outputs that are not quantitative in nature. [DOD,
1972] Descriptive and comparison analysis took a leading
role in the evaluation of non-quantifiable areas. Research
will cover historical data on grievance issues, case load,
and arbitration cases on file, their demands, judgments and
'•cost" and "benefit" information.
13

II. ARBITRATION AND THE LAW
A. BACKGROUND
Federal labor and management relations are governed by
Title VII of Public Law 95-454 of the Civil Service Reform
Act of 1978. [CSRA, 1978] In general. Title VII was estab-
lished under the principle that labor organizations and
statutory protections of the right to organize and bargain
collectively in the Federal Civil Service are found to be in
the public interest. Title VII takes into consideration and
recognizes certain unique requirements in the federal sector
and the need for efficient, effective government operations.
Title VII describes in detail the provisions of labor
management relations, the rights and obligations of federal
agencies and labor unions. Title VII also details the
grievance, appeal and review procedures, plus other
administrative processes. [CSRA, 1978]
The employees' right to organize in the public sector,
bargain collectively and participate through labor organiza-
tions of their own choosing is said to safeguard the public
interest, contribute to the effective conduct of public
business and, most importantly, facilitate and encourage the
amenable settlement of disputes between employee and
employer involving conditions of employment. It is the
intent of Public Law 95-454 to command the highest standards
14

of employee performance in matters that are in the public's
benefit and to facilitate, through the continued development
and implementation of modern and progressive work practices,
specifically those procedures leaning toward arbitration,
competent accomplishment of government business. [Coulson,
1978]
The employment of binding arbitration in the federal
sector originated in the 1969 Interagency Study Committee's
report and its recommendations on labor-management relations
in the federal service. This report resulted in the issuance
of Executive Order No. 11,491 in October 1969. This order
legalized the use of arbitration to resolve grievances
arising under collective bargaining agreements. This manner
of handling grievances as part of the Federal Sector Labor-
Management Program has increased substantially. The use of
the arbitration process, which is now a well established
means of settling collective bargaining disputes, promotes
the basic goal of constructive and cooperative relationships
between federal sector labor organizations and management
officials. Thus, disputes in the federal sector are
adjudicated, not in a forum imposed on disputants by law
or executive order, but by an impartial third party who has





The Civil Service Reform Act provides a vehicle for
federal employees to exercise the right to form, join or
assist any labor organization or, on the other hand, to
refrain from participating in such activity. This right is
to be exercised freely without fear of penalty or reprisal.
Each employee will be "actively" protected in the exercise
of those rights. [CSRA, 1978]
The individual employee may act for a labor organization
in the capacity of a representative, presenting the views of
that labor organization to the heads of agencies or appro-
priate authorities. He has the right to engage in
collective bargaining with respect to conditions of employ-
ment and the right to binding arbitration. [CSRA, 1978]
C. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY (FLRA)
The Federal Labor Relations Authority was established by
public law to provide leadership in the inception and
installation of policies and guidance relating to labor-
management relations. The FLRA is the governing body
responsible for carrying out the provisions as set forth in
Title VII. The Authority's General Council investigates
alleged unfair labor practices, and has direct authority
over and responsibility for monitoring civil service
employee -management relations. [CSRA, 1978]
16

The Federal Labor Relations Authority determines the
appropriateness of labor organization representation and
supervises or conducts elections to determine whether a
labor organization has been selected as an exclusive repre-
sentative by a majority of the employees. The Authority has
the power to conduct hearings and resolve unfair labor
complaints and to resolve exceptions to an arbitrator's
awards under Title IV. [CSRA, 1978]
D. MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
Title VII generally states that nothing within the legal
phraseology will be interpreted so that it shall affect the
authority of any management official in determining the
mission, budget, organization, number of employees and
internal security practices of his agency. More specifically,
this means that management, within legal restraints, has
total authority to hire, assign, lay off and retain
employees. Management may also suspend, remove, reduce in
pay grade or take any other disciplinary action against its
employees. A manager, within applicable laws, may also
assign work and promote from properly ranked candidates.
But a manager is strictly prohibited from doing anything
that would preclude any labor organization from negotiating
working conditions. [CSRA, 1978]
17

E. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF AGENCIES AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
The exclusive recognition of labor organizations is
granted in that all governmental agencies shall accord
exclusive recognition to a labor organization if that organ-
ization has been selected as the representative in a secret
ballot and by a majority. The agency for which this
majority works must grant exclusive recognition. How
employees may select a labor union, how possible discrepan-
cies in the exclusive representation appointment are
handled, and the power that the National Labor Relations
Authority (NLRA) may exercise in controlling and settling
disputes in that area are all covered under the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978.
The "exclusive right concept" is important to this
thesis as this "right" is granted only to the party that can
legally act for labor in any formal discussion with manage-
ment, including arbitration. Of course, those items to be
discussed range from general working conditions to unfair
labor practices as described in Section 7116 of Section VII
of Public Law 95-454. [1978]
As part of the basic foundation of collective bargaining
is the "duty" to bargain in "good faith." This obligation
required of both parties is the crux of the intent of the
collective bargaining process and arbitration, and ties
directly back to the goal of Section VII of Public Law
95-454. This goal, reiterated here, is:
18

to promote constructive and cooperative relationships
between federal sector labor organizations and man-
agement officials.
F. NEGOTIATION IMPASSES AND THE FEDERAL SERVICE IMPASSES
PANEL
If negotiations break down between labor and management,
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service is required
to provide services to assist in the resolution of negotia-
tion impasses not only to the federal agency, but also to
the labor union involved. If this procedure fails, the
parties may agree to adopt a procedure for binding arbitra-
tion but only if this procedure is approved by the Federal
Services Impasses Panel. The Federal Services Impasses
Panel is a department within the Federal Labor Relations
Authority and is chartered to provide services to management
and labor to resolve impassed labor disputes. [Loevi, 1978]
After all avenues of voluntary negotiation have failed,
the Impasses Panel shall after hearing all the evidence,
pass judgment and this judgment will be binding (same
scenario for any third party arbitrator). [Kagel, 1961]
G. EXCEPTION TO ARBITRAL AWARDS
Even though it is generally accepted that arbitration is
binding (assuming both parties are negotiating in good
faith), either party may appeal an arbitrator's decision to
the National Labor Relations Authority (NLRA.) . This appeal
19

may be upheld and the award may be overturned if it is
contrary to any law, rule or regulation. If there is no
appeal to the arbitrator's award filed, then the arbitra-
tor's award will be final and binding. [Coulson, 1978]
H . SUMMARY
This chapter has summarized the basic legal concepts
dealing with labor-management relations and details policy
dealing with labor organizations and statutory protections
of the right to organize and bargain collectively in the
Federal Civil Service. This in itself is proclaimed as
being in the "public interest." The Civil Service Reform
Act of 1978 recognizes certain special requirements of the
federal sector and the need for efficient, effective govern-
ment operations.
The CSRA is broad in scope and includes personnel poli-
cies, practices and matters affecting working conditions.
The representation rights entitle the exclusive union repre-
sentative to be present at all formal discussions between
management and employee in the bargaining unit concerning
any grievance or any personnel policy or practice or other
general condition of employment.
The law not only allows for employee participation in
organized labor organizations but requires management to
actively protect that right so that the member may belong to
said organization without fear or penalty.
20

There are strict standards of evidence in arbitration
cases and arbitration awards may be reviewed on the grounds
that those standards are not abided by. The issue of
"arbitrability" will be decided by the third party arbitra-
tor. If voluntary arrangements, including mediation, fail
to resolve bargaining impasses, either party may request
action be taken by the Federal Service Impasses Panel,
which can direct a settlement. It is important to note
that the disputing parties can only use arbitration if
authorized by the Impasses Panel.
21

III. SELECTION OF THE ARBITRATOR
A. GENERAL
Usually, the labor agreement negotiated between labor
and management stipulates how an arbitrator will be selected.
If the disputing parties cannot agree and the labor agreement
does not stipulate how an arbitrator is to be selected, the
American Arbitration Association (AAA), a private association,
or the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) , a
government agency, can provide assistance. [Coulson, 1978]
This assistance is usually in the form of providing a list
of qualified abritrators to choose from. The FMCS may, on
the other hand, complete the selection process by simply
appointing an arbitrator that it considers suitable. There
are many forms of "arbitrator," some of which are the single
arbitrator, the umpire system and the tripartite. [Loevi, 1978]
The selection process is initiated when the Secretary of
Labor along with the Federal Service Impasses Panel deter-
mines that arbitration is required. Most federal agencies
have written into their labor agreements a stipulation for
the use of an "ad hoc" selection basis. An "ad hoc" selec-
tion is one in which the selection of an arbitrator is
appointed for one particular arbitration proceeding. This
selection is made from a list provided by the AAA or FMCS.
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These two organizations screen their list to ensure high
caliber and strictly neutral membership. [Coulson, 1978]
B. THE SELECTION PROCESS
The selection process is usually initiated by the sub-
mission of a "demand for arbitration" by either of the
negotiating parties. After receipt of this "demand," the
AAA or FMCS will provide a list of five to seven qualified
arbitrators to select from. Each party then takes turns in
striking out a name until one is left. [Coulson, 1978]
Prior to selection, finding out as much as possible
about an arbitrator can be very important to the parties in
the dispute, especially if that information can be used to
determine if a particular arbitrator has displayed a certain
style or displayed certain sympathies in the past that would
be beneficial to the cause. The obvious question that should
be asked is how does one proceed to obtain this valuable
information, information that may help in the selection of
an arbitrator that will be in sympathy with one's cause.
Such information is limited, as is the system which one is
forced to use. [Coulson, 1978]
The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. and the Commerce
Clearing House, Inc. regularly publish the decisions of most
arbitrators. Therefore, it is possible to find information
on the particular decisions made by particular arbitrators
in the past. But one should read these decisions with
23

caution as the afore -mentioned organizations do not publish
all of the case decisions. An arbitrator may in certain
instances be prohibited from submitting his decision by
either of the disputing parties or the arbitrator may choose
not to submit his decision for reasons of his own. One may
expect to find a limited portion of the arbitrator's view-
point and more than likely only that portion of his output
he considers more to his benefit. The case as written may
not be related to the specific dispute at hand; this along
with the above comments could result in some benefit in the
selection decision, but most likely will end up being simply
an insight into the arbitrator's style and possibly his
personal approach to problem solving. Probably, the most
useful source of information about a particular arbitrator
may be from other parties that have actually had prior
working knowledge and dealings with the arbitrator himself.
[Loevi, 1978]
No two arbitrators are alike in experience level.
Therefore, the selection process is no trivial matter. Both
the AAA and FMCS will submit pertinent biographical data on
each arbitrator, including education, occupation and work
experience and, of course, cost data such as fees, etc.
Another highly recommended source of information is the Civil
Service Commission Labor Agreement Information Retrieval
System. This system has a reputation for fair, honest and
objective evaluation of individual arbitrators. [Loevi, 1978]
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The sources of information about an arbitrator are
suspect and provide very selective data at best. The data
received stems from written decisions and is screened by the
publication. Information obtained from sources such as
union or management representatives that have had past case
experience are subjective judgments that are slanted and
colored. These subjective opinions are arrived at by reasons
not the least of which is whether the case was won or lost.
C. TYPES OF ARBITRATORS
When dealing with choosing either an "ad hoc" arbitrator
or a permanent arbitrator, one should consider the following:
to eliminate time and effort needed to select arbitrators, to
familiarize them as to the local conditions before cases
can be decided or awards submitted, and basically, to
ensure consistency of the decisions, it may seem logical
to retain the services of an arbitrator on a permanent
basis (umpire system). Nevertheless, the umpire system
is not used often in the federal sector. [Coulson, 1978]
This will be discussed in more detail later in this section.
Another decision is the selection between a single
arbitrator and an arbitration panel. Penels are usually
tripartite in construction and are established by first
having each party select one arbitrator, those two then
selecting a third. All three arbitrators are supposed to
hear the case as neutrals. Most of the decisions handed
25

down by tripartite panels are on a two-to-one vote. [Coulson,
1978]
There are in all of the above types of arbitration
selection techniques, potential hazards. In the permanent
umpire situation, easy access to an arbitrator is obtained.
This may give the disputing parties an inverse incentive in
that they might tend to be lax in discharging their respon-
sibilities under the established grievance procedures. In
other words, the parties would simply use the grievance
procedure as a pro forma route to the permanent arbitrator.
The retention of a permanent arbitrator involves a long-term
agreement for services and, if the parties become dissatis-
fied with the arbitrator's style, decisions, etc., it could
result in very negative consequences for both parties.
[Loevi, 1978]
In the tripartite panel most decisions are handed down
as previously stated: by a two-to-one vote. One might ask
why this system is used when it seems that the arbitrators
selected from each party vote for their parties' cause and
the third party arbitrator makes the deciding choice as if
he were a single arbitrator anyway. The plain truth is that
each party wants a representative present during the delibera-
tions. Is there any real advantage? At first glance it
appears not because of the obvious delays in the process
resulting from panel deliberations as well as the added cost
26

o£ having three arbitrators. The view seems to be widely
held as the tripartite panel is unpopular with both manage-
ment and labor alike. [Loevi, 1978]
Given the considerable savings in time and effort
devoted to the selection process, it would seem that a
permanent arbitration system in the federal sector where
there are significant arbitration case loads would be
extremely attractive if those pitfalls mentioned above could
be circumvented. Other than what has been discussed, the
literature seems to favor "ad hoc" selection regardless of
time and cost obstacles.
D. SELECTION PROCEDURE
No single part of the arbitration process is any more
important than the selection of the arbitrator. [Kagel, 1961]
Upon receipt of a demand for arbitration, the AAA or
FMCS will acknowledge its receipt to the party concerned and
send a list of proposed arbitrators. This list is not just
randomly submitted, but is made up of the arbitrators that
the agency feels are best qualified to handle the situation
as described by the union's statement of the nature of the
dispute. Basic information about each arbitrator is
attached to the list. When the list is received by both
parties, they in turn cross off the unacceptable names and
state their preferences of those who are left. [Loevi, 1978]
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Once the choice is made, the list is forwarded to the
AAA or FMCS and is routinely approved. The arbitrator is
contacted and the nature of the case discussed to see if
there is any reason why he cannot act with impartiality in a
dispute between the two parties. The Code of Professional
Responsibility governs the discussions and disclosures when
this interaction is being accomplished. [Coulson, 1978]
If both parties are unable to reach a mutual decision on
the selection of an arbitrator, additional lists may be
petitioned but only by the solicitation of both disputing
parties. If both parties still cannot agree on a selectee,
then the AAA or FMCS is authorized to make an administrative
appointment. This appointment will not be an arbitrator
whose name was crossed out by either party on the prior list
or lists. Such an appointment, because of information
received about the specific grievance issues and the dis-
puting parties themselves from the appointing agencies'
local representatives, can be informed and sensitive. It
should be pointed out that the AAA and FMCS serve as expe-
diting agencies and act for both labor and management. [AAA,
1979]
In selecting an arbitrator, labor and management will
want to ensure that the arbitrator is competent to under-
stand the particular kinds of issues that will be involved
in the case. In other words, does he have the capability to
28

sift facts, have the technical expertise and have a
particular philosophy which would make him suitable to
weigh the issues of this or that specific situation?
[Beal, 1982]
The actual selection of arbitrators in the past reflects
an unfortunate by-product that is inherently built into the
selection system. This by-product is that disputing parties
are hesitant to accept an unknown factor. Therefore, the
tried and true arbitrators are used over and over again and
it is extremely difficult for a new and aspiring arbitrator
to get selected. He will encounter measurable resistance
to his bid for acceptance iii the field. [Coulson, 1978]
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IV. THE ARBITRATION DECISION
A. GENERAL
The decision to arbitrate deals with subjects such as
arbitrability , case merit, political considerations and cost.
The arbitration process, to resolve a grievance, will entail
the expenditure of considerable effort and resources. There-
fore, all avenues for settlement should be exhausted prior
to initiating the arbitration process. [Loevi, 1978]
Arbitration is a participatory system that involves many
individuals from both management and labor. Since arbitra-
tion takes the final decision out of the hands of the
disputing parties, both must protect their interest by
making every possible effort to prepare and present their
case in the best manner possible. The case must be prepared
to convince the arbitrator that this position is the correct
one. How? By the logical presentation of facts and
arguments. [Kagel, 1961; AAA, 1981]
B. ARBITRABILITY
The first decision to be considered is that of arbi-
trability. In the federal sector this question is far
from moot as Executive Order 11491 details specific exclu-
sions from the coverage of grievance and arbitration
procedures. [Loevi, 1978] Generally speaking, the deter-
mination that a dispute is arbitrable is basically a decision
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whether arbitration procedures, as defined, are in fact
permitted to cover that subject under dispute. [Updegraff,
1979] An example of what would not be arbitrable is a
disputed item for which a statutory appeal procedure already
exists
.
The elimination of disputed items covered by statutory
appeal is peculiar to the federal sector in that it rules
out such subjects as classification appeals, discrimination
appeals, performance ratings, etc. It is noteworthy that
more than twenty types of management actions are basically
exempt from arbitration. [Coulson, 1978]
The question of arbitrability simply is a statement of
whether an issue can or cannot be properly decided by a
neutral party. There are two basic questions to ask when
discussing arbitrability:
(1) Is the process procedurally correct?
(2) Is the matter substantively arbitrable?
[Coulson, 1978; Loevi, 1978]
The question of procedural correctness is simply asking
if the labor representative has followed the properly estab-
lished grievance procedures. The question of substantive
arbitrability is asking whether the subject matter of the
grievance itself should or should not be an issue that can
be settled through arbitration. In short, a substantive
arbitrability question is a challenge that the nature of the
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grievance does not fall within the negotiated contractural
relationship; therefore, the arbitrator has no authority to
resolve it.
Disputes as to whether or not a grievance is subject to
statutory appeal must be submitted to the Assistant
Secretary of Labor for Labor Management Relations. [Updegraff,
1970] The concern over making a single body responsible for
this decision in determining questions relating to the
coverage of statutory appeal procedures is reflected in the
revision of Section 13(d) of Executive Order 11491:
Questions that cannot be resolved by the parties
as to whether or not a grievance is on an item for
which a statutory appeal procedure exists, shall be
referred to the Assistant Secretary for his decision.
Other questions as to whether or not a grievance is
on a matter subject to the grievance procedure in an
existing agreement, or is subject to arbitration under
that agreement, may by agreement of the parties be sub-
mitted to arbitration or may be referred to the
Assistant Secretary for decision.
It is important to note that here the Assistant Secretary
is taking on the role of an arbitrator and that, once this
question is referred to him, his decision is final and may
not be referred back to the parties for a decision by
another arbitrator.
The arbitrator that has been selected by the two feuding
parties or appointed by the FMCS normally, if both parties
agree to submit to his authority, rules on the question
posed above. Except that the arbitrator has no authority





Since both management and labor do not operate in a
vacuum, there are political considerations that affect their
actions. Both parties have political constituencies to
consider and, in some situations, these constituencies are a
principal factor in course determination. [Anon, 1975]
Theoretically, politics should play a very minor role in
the decision to carry a grievance to arbitration. Needless
to say, there is often a very wide gap between the theory of
pure idealistic grievance arbitration and inter/intra-
organization practice. The political motivation for a
union to arbitrate usually stems from the need to demonstrate
that they are active. The more the labor representative unit
is involved in this area, the need to demonstrate employee
advocacy is more or less satisfied. This type of involve-
ment relates to a measurement of union effectiveness in the
eyes of the union membership. The more visible the actions
of the union are, the more effective its membership believes
it to be. The same principle applies and holds for those





The prep.iration process is probably the most difficult
and time consuming aspect of arbitration. By the time the
grievance case has reached this stage, representatives of
both parties have usually spent many hours discussing the
grievance and have become very familiar with all aspects of
the case. If they are unable to settle the dispute, both
labor and management now face the enormous problem of
presenting their position in a factual and logical manner to
an arbitrator. Although great effort has been exerted in
choosing an arbitrator that has some expertise in the field
of the disputed grievance, the arbitrator usually lacks
detailed knowledge of the case until the hearing stage
begins. [Coulson, 1978]
B. PROCEDURAL STEPS
Proper preparation for cases going to arbitration will
always entail such preliminaries as evidence gathering and
witness interviewing. As Robert Coulson explains in his
book on labor arbitration:
Effective presentation of the facts and arguments must
begin with thorough preparation. [1978]
He recommends the following steps:
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1. Study the original statement of the grievance and
review its history through every step o£ the grievance
machinery.
2. Review the collective bargaining agreement from
beginning to end. Often, clauses which at first glance
seem to be unrelated to the grievance will be found to
have some bearing.
3. Assemble all documents and papers you will need
at the hearing. Make photostatic copies for the arbi-
trator and for the other party. If some of the docu-
ments you need are in the possession of the other party,
ask that they be brought to the arbitration. The
arbitrator usually has authority to subpoena documents
and witnesses if they cannot be made available in any
other way.
4. Interview all of your witnesses. Make certain
they understand the theory of your case, as well as the
importance of their own testimony. Run through the
testimony several times. Role-play the probable cross-
examination.
5. Make a written summary of the testimony of each witness
This can be useful as a checklist at the hearing, to
ensure that nothing is overlooked.
6. Study the case from the other side's point of
view. Be prepared to deal with opposing evidence
with arguments.
7. Discuss your outline of the case with others in
your organization. A fresh viewpoint will often dis-
close weak spots that you may have overlooked.
8. Read published awards on the issue that seem to be
involved in your case. While awards by other arbitra-
tors on cases between other parties are not decisive
as to your own case, they m.ay be persuasive. The
American Arbitration Association has published
summaries of thousands of labor arbitration awards
in its monthly publications. Use these summaries and
their cumulative indexes as research tools.
[Coulson, 1978]
Clearly, part of the preparation should begin the moment
the grievance occurs; but, in following the above checklist,
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the prehearing preparation becomes a logical sequence of
events instead of a hit or miss attempt.
When analyzing the present labor agreement, try to
ascertain the pertinent provisions relating to the dispute.
Study the agreement as a whole and then apply the particu-
lars to the fact in question. Research previous agreements
to see if any changes have been made or if other cases have
been settled under the specific disputed fact by mediation
or by arbitration in the past. [Frazier, 1977; Coulson, 1978]
The study of grievance committee minutes and other docu-
ments used by the grievance committee can produce invaluable
background information and may actually disclose the
"theory" upon which the other party is basing its case.
[Updegraff, 1970; Coulson, 1978]
The study of grievance committee minutes and other docu-
ments used by the grievance committee can produce invaluable
background information and may actually disclose the "theory"
upon which the other party is basing its case. [Updegraff,
1970; Coulson, 1978]
When interviewing witnesses, ensure that a detailed
written record of the interview is maintained. Based upon
this interview, one should determine what the nature of his
testimony is and whether his testimony should be used. By
that statement, it is meant that one should size up the
witness; try to evaluate him as to what kind of impression
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he would make and whether his testimony will positively
affect the arbitrator's decision. [Updegraff, 1970; Coulson,
1978]
It is important to consider doing the following:
(1) Visit the scene of the dispute; prepare
the witness prior to the official hearing.
(2) Decide upon and prepare exhibits.
(3) Develop the theory of the case.
[Harrison, 1979]
C. PREHEARING CONFERENCES
Prehearing conferences are an important aspect of case
preparation and serve at least three important purposes.
First, they provide a vehicle to handle necessary adminis-
trative questions such as time and location of the hearing.
Second, they allow the parties to review jointly the issues
involved and possibly to agree on specific questions to be
resolved by the arbitrator. Finally, the prehearing con-
ference can serve as a communication vehicle for the exchange
of evidence and witness lists.
D. EVIDENCE GATHERING
Evidence gathering is, by nature, the primary function
of case preparation. The contention in the hearing will
normally be proved either by documented evidence or state-
ments of witnesses who have first-hand knowledge of the
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issue to be resolved. Evidence gathering may be varied from
case to case but, according to Francis Loevi , Jr., there are
various aspects of the evidence -gathering process common to
the majority of cases. Allan J. Harrison, in his book.
Preparing and Presenting Your Arbitration Case
,
recommends
the following step -by-step outline to evidence gathering:
1. Assuming there is argument over language imple-
mentation, start with the contract.
a. Write out or outline all contract provisions,
or parts of provisions, that support your
interpretation.
b. Using the rules of contract construction,
write out your interpretation(s) . Use as
many words and phrases from the contract as
possible
.
c. Apply any relevant arguments based on equity,
common sense, and past practice that will help
support your contract interpretation.
d. Assemble the facts and evidence needed to
support the assertions made in a, b, and c above.
For example:
(1) Have the contract ready as a joint exhibit.
(2) List any supporting facts that the other
side will agree to.
(3) Review previous contracts or written
contract proposals, resolved grievances
and other arbitration awards.
(4) Screen witnesses who can testify directly
to the meaning the parties gave the language
during negotiations and grievance meetings.
e. Review all of the opposing arguments and evidence
you anticipate and write out a response that
either
:
(1) Refutes that argument or evidence, or
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(2) minimizes or diminishes its importance.
2. Assuming there is some dispute as to the occurrence
that caused the grievance, follow these steps:
a. Write out a clear chronological sequence of
events, noting the dates and times, the main
participants and any witnesses, the exact
locations of events. In short, describe
what happened in detail.
b. See what the other side agrees with. If both of
you can agree on a matter, label it a fact.
c. List documents and witnesses that will confirm
the above rendition of events.
d. Prepare an explanation of events: Why did one
event follow another? Why was the employee
angry? Why did Sam get sent home?
e. Explain why your version of what happened
establishes that the company did or did not
violate the contract.
f. Next, do all the above as if you were working
for your opponent. Then, prepare to rebut or
diminish that position.
3. Prepare your evidence for presentation.
a. See if you can obtain a signed, written stip-
ulation of the facts. If not, find out what
differences there are.
b. Prepare a copy of all your documents in
triplicate. Normally Xeroxing is the quickest
and cheapest method.
(1) Obtaining copies of your own documents should
not be difficult; however, the other party
may have documents and records which are
critical to your case. Most commonly the
employer has many more personnel records
than does the union. If you want a given
record, first make an oral request and
explain its necessity in assessing the
merits of the grievance. If the other
party refuses to cooperate, submit the
request in writing. If you are under the
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National Labor Relations Act, and your
adversary again refuses, file a charge with
the nearest NLRB office. Also keep a copy
of the request to show the arbitrator at
the hearing if you have still not obtained
the information. Under either state or
National Labor Law, the parties are entitled
to information needed to intelligently pro-
cess a grievance.
(2) In order to establish their authenticity,
some documents, such as notes taken in
bargaining or at a grievance meeting or the
daily log kept by a steward or a foreman,
will probably require testimony from the
individual who kept the record.
c. Decide who your witnesses will be and who will
probably testify for the other party.
[Harrison, 1979]
E. WITNESS PREPARATION
Witness preparation, one of the most important aspects
of case preparation is often overlooked. [Kagel, 1961]
There are basically three objectives to be met in
witness preparation: First, to have the witness overcome
the fear of formal proceedings. Most witnesses will be in
this role for the first time and fear of the unknown may
cause them to react in such a manner as to undermine their
testimony.
Second, to eliminate surprise, the witness should have
the opportunity to discuss thoroughly his role with counsel
prior to the hearing. This forewarning of the possibility
of unexpected statements may prevent actions that could be
detrimental to the case.
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Last, if the witness is to have credibility with the
arbitrator, witness preparation must involve coordination of
each witness' testimony. This coordination will eliminate
gaps and redundancies and will better present the case as
a total picture instead of a piecemeal happening of indi-
vidual events leading to the dispute.
Witness preparation consists of at least three phases
that might be labeled as the initial interview, follow-up,
and coordination phases.
The initial interview, in concurrence with the evidence
gathering interview, will provide the witness with a first
glimpse at answering questions with regard to the specific
issues of the case. It is recommended that this conversa-
tion be taped for several reasons. First, it allows the
witness to become acquainted with the feeling of testifying
"on the record." Second, it provides an accurate account of
the conversation, one that is instantly recalled for review.
Last, it allows the interviewer to observe the witness'
reaction and poise without having to worry about note taking.
During the follow-up interview, it should be possible to
develop an outline and to present to each witness what is
expected of him in his testimony and give the interviewer
the opportunity to practice with the witness.
The coordination of witnesses to develop a comprehensive
step-by-step "big picture" case is important. [Harrison, 1979]
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In this phase, witnesses will become familiar with and
understand that testimony from other witnesses will form a
cohesive case. It puts the case in perspective and elimi-
nates mystery. [Loevi, 1978]
F . SUMMARY
Case preparation deals with the central question of
whether or not the employer violated the contract language
and what is the proper settlement if a violation has been
committed. Serious preparation for an arbitration hearing
cannot be undertaken without first formulating a theory of
the case. Without this formulation, it becomes almost
impossible to separate what is relevant from what is irrele^
vant in the evidence -gathering phase. Without theory




VI. CASE PRESENTATION AND THE ARBITRATOR'S AWARD
A. GENERAL
The principal task in this phase o£ arbitration is to
present the evidence to an arbitrator, an arbitrator who
normally has little or no knowledge of the case prior to the
hearing. So, one may say, the hearing is an opportunity to
educate the arbitrator of the facts supporting the disputing
parties' arguments. [Loevi, 1978] The hearing is a chance
to place all the evidence in support of the case before the
neutral party in an orderly fashion. [Harrison, 1979]
The arbitrator is the key person in the hearing phase
of arbitration. He conducts the hearing, decides on the
admissibility of evidence and makes the final and binding
award on the issues submitted to him. This should not be
forgotten by party advocates when presenting the case. The
hearing is the climax of the arbitration procedure and the
arbitrator is to ensure that it is a full and fair process,
not to satisfy both sides, but to reach a fair decision
based strictly on the record as presented. [Harrison, 1979]
Despite the informal, voluntary and usually very
friendly character of the hearing proceedings, it must be
borne in mind that one or the other party may afterward,
in dissatisfaction with the award, seek to avoid compliance.
Therefore, party representatives and arbitrators alike must
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seek to be thorough and as rule abiding as possible. All
applicable and binding regulations must be considered.
[Harrison, 1979] The arbitrator's responsibility is far
from moot and both he and the disputing parties must under-
stand their position in no uncertain detail. [Updegraff,
1970]
B. THE ARBITRATOR'S RESPONSIBILITY
The responsibility of presiding over the hearing is that
of the arbitrator. [Coulson, 1978] Basically, he is to
ensure that the hearing is conducted in a fair and impartial
manner. There are certain procedural requirements that must
be met in order for the award of the arbitrator to be immune
from appeal. Those briefly stated are:
(1) All interested parties are to be notified of
the time and place of the hearing.
(2) Evidence will be allowed without restriction.
(3) Full cross-examination of witnesses will be
granted.
(4) Oral argument will be permitted at the con-
clusion of the evidence presentation.
(5) Reasonable opportunity will be granted to
submit written briefs.
[Loevi, 1978]
Prior to the hearing, the arbitrator will be required to
inform himself of the extent of his authority and any
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particular procedural requirements of the case at hand. He
should outline to the parties involved his method of con-
ducting the hearing. [Coulson, 1978]
He also has the responsibility to ensure that the issues
have been clearly defined and that the "burden of proof" is
not an issue of any one party but rests equally with both
sides. [Updegraff, 1970; Coulson, 1978]
C. HEARING PROCEDURES
The format of the arbitration hearing will usually vary
very little from hearing to hearing, but the arbitrator may
vary the procedure at his own initiative or at the request
of a particular party. [Harrison, 1979]
The customary order of the proceeding usually follows
an itinerary as indicated below:
(a) The acceptance by the arbitrator into the
record of any information or evidence that
the parties have jointly agreed to.
(b) The decision of "who goes first."
(c) Opening statements by the initiating party,
followed by a similar statement by the other side.
(d) Presentation of witnesses and evidence by the
initiating party, with cross-examination by the
corresponding party.
(e) Summation by both parties, closing statements,




Each step in the itinerary will briefly be discussed
below:
1. Mutually Agreed Upon Evidence and/or Information
Mutually agreed upon facts will be referred to as
"joint submissions." The acceptance of any joint sub-
missions and stipulations into the record, that both parties
have agreed upon, should be the first order of business by
the arbitrator. [Harrison, 1979] The receipt of an agree-
ment of issue (s) to be resolved starts the hearing off ahead
of schedule; if the issue is defined and jointly agreed upon,
this will reduce the "burden of proof" each party has to
establish in presenting its position. (Loevi, 1978; Coulson,
1978]
By stating facts that are agreed upon by both
parties, the obvious advantage is the elimination of un-
necessary time and effort spent establishing the authenticity
and relevance of uncontested facts. [Harrison, 1979]
2. Who Goes First
The union, being the party that normally initiates a
grievance, usually bears the burden of proof, proving that
the management of the federal agency has violated the labor
agreement that is currently in force. The union will
normally go first in the hearing proceedings. This is the
nature of most arbitration hearings, except in disciplinary
cases, where management has initiated action for reasons it
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feels are important enough to enforce, therefore bearing the
"burden of proof." [Harrison, 1979; Coulson, 1978]
This order of case presentation, being the norm, may
be changed by the arbitrator in the name of efficiency and
equity, or by the agreement of the two disputing parties.
[Harrison, 1979] The bottom line is that both parties bear
the burden of proof as both have to fully support their
claims with substantiated evidence. Who goes first should
not, in the long run, dramatically change the decision of
the arbitrator.
3. The Opening Statement
The opening statement lays the ground work for the
testimony of the witnesses and helps the arbitrator to
understand the relevance of the oral and written evidence to
be presented. It gives each party the opportunity to brief
the arbitrator on the case from its own viewpoint.
[Harrison, 1979]
The opening statement should identify the issues,
indicate what is to be proved and specify the relief sought.
[Harrison, 1979] The obvious benefit of making an opening
statement, if it is well prepared, is that the arbitrator
will be better able to view evidence presented during the
hearing in a light of a past concise and congruent summation.
[Coulson, 1978]
Because of the importance of the opening statement,
some party representatives present it in written format. This
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makes the initial statement a part of the permanent record.
In any event, the opening statement should be made orally,
whether it is chosen to submit a written version or not.
The oral presentation adds extra emphasis to the case's
position. [AAA, 1979]
4. Presentation of Witnesses and Evidence
Certain documentary evidence may be essential in
presenting the case. Documentary evidence, such as the
labor agreement or at least the section pertaining to the
disputed items, should always be submitted. Other documented
evidence that may require submission is official minutes of
contract negotiation meetings, wage data, relevant corre-
spondence, etc. [Updegraff, 1979] Regardless of the type of
documentary evidence presented, each piece should be identi-
fied and properly authenticated. A copy should be given
to the other side for scrutiny. The significance of each
document should be highlighted with key words and phrases
underlined to focus the arbitrator's attention on the
essential parts. [Harrison, 1979]
The presentation of witnesses by either party is
called direct examination. The process of examining the
witness by the opposing party is called cross-examination.
In both cases, the first thing that takes place is the
establishment of the identity and competence of the witness
with respect to the issues at hand. [Harrison, 1979]
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The witness, during direct examination, should be
allowed to tell his story in his own words and without
interruption. [Harrison, 1979] Leading questions are allowed
but not recommended and should only be used to help empha-
size points already made or in leading the witness back to
the main theme of the testimony i£ that witness has gone
astray. [Coulson, 1978; Loevi, 1978]
The objective of cross-examination is to allow the
arbitrator to both listen to answers and observe the wit-
ness' demeanor when subjected to question by the opposing
party. Every witness is subject to cross-examination.
Cross-examination should be used to disclose facts that
the witness may not have brought out in direct testimony.
Cross-examination also gives the opposing party the oppor-
tunity to correct "misstatements" by placing those state-
ments in their correct perspective, and it also allows for
the intensive scrutiny of the witness' reliability and
credibility. [Harrison, 1979]
5. The Summary
Before the arbitrator closes the hearing, he will
allow each party the opportunity to review the evidence,
summarize the facts and issues, and justify the decision
the arbitrator is being asked to make. This is accomplished
in a "closing statement." This closing statement is the
most important opportunity that is provided to either party.
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This last opportunity to convince the arbitrator that their
party's position should be upheld, taken seriously, attacked
with vigor and done as professionally as possible. This
is the last chance to sway the arbitrator and to refute
points made by the other side. [Loevi, 1978]
D. POST-HEARING PROCEDURE
After the summation by both parties, the arbitrator will
normally declare the hearing closed. But prior to this, the
arbitrator will ask if the parties wish to file a post-
hearing brief. [Coulson, 1978] This post-hearing brief
is a valuable tool as it can be used to enhance a particular
point of view or discuss weaknesses in the opposing party's
presentation, [Updegraff , 1979] The arbitrator will then
study the newly received material and include it in his




The award should be limited to the issue (s) as defined
by the arbitration agreement. It should decide each claim
and should be final. At this point, the arbitrator's obli-
gation and power is terminated and his decision stands
unless both parties mutually agree to reopen the case. In
such event, the arbitrator's power is restored and he again




VII. ARBITRATION: AN EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
A. GENERAL
Briefly described, this evaluation applies a conceptual
framework that systematically investigates, by formal tech-
niques, the costs and benefits of an already established
situation. [DODinst, 1972]
Considering the importance of negotiating labor disputes
under law and, of equal importance, of funding the process
with tax dollars, there is a clear responsibility to investi
gate the effectiveness and efficiency of arbitration itself.
Arbitration must be proven to benefit the people it serves
such that the outputs derived outweigh the costs, be they
monetary or otherwise.
The evaluations of costs and benefits for public sector
organizations have unique problems that are associated to
their (the public program or agency) special situations.
These costs and benefits are mostly measured in non-
quantifiable terms, but are measured nevertheless.
Economic analysis is, of course, more accurate when applied
to situations in which outputs can be defined in terms of
physical yield. It may, however, be applied, with less
precision, when dealing with non-quantifiable outputs, if
the benefits are accurately defined and measured in terms of
"relative benefit" or "relative cost." [Gramlich, 1981]
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In such economic analysis, arbitration is frequently
defined as an independent variable that affects such outcome
variables as wages, strikes or bargaining incentives. Less
frequently, arbitration is viewed as a dependent variable
reflecting such concepts as "interest group conflict."
[Feville, 1979] This economic analysis considers three
potential primary benefits and two potential costs. Also,
process and result measures will be investigated and con-
clusions presented as to the level of effectiveness and
efficiency insinuated by those measurements.
B. BENEFIT CRITERIA
This analysis will establish three basic criteria for
deriving benefits from compulsory arbitration in the public
sector. These benefits are:
1. Arbitration as a protector of the public interest.
2. Arbitration as a protector of employee interest.
3. Arbitration as a regulator of group conflict.
[Feville, 1979]
1. Arbitration as the Guardian of the Public Interest
The most visible benefit of binding arbitration is
the guarantee of "no strikes" by public employees. [CSRA,
1978] This stipulation within current law prevents the
disruption of public services such as mail and air con-
troller services. To measure this output it will be
necessary to compare a federal agency with a private concern
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which does not have the "illegal to strike" protection.
This will be a difficult chore. It should be noted that
arbitration is not a perfect "no strike" insurance as it, of
course, does not protect against "illegal" strikes, work
stoppage or slowdowns. These conditions are seldom realized
in the federal sector as federal employees are acutely-
aware that the "illegal to strike" law could exist without
arbitration and that arbitration provides them a vehicle for
airing their views.
2. Arbitration as the Guardian of the Employee Interest
This "benefit" is diametrically opposed to the
concept that arbitration can be both representative of
employee interest and also be a limiting factor of the
collective bargaining process. [Feville, 1979] By imposing
compulsory arbitration on employees and taking away the
right to strike, it (arbitration) seems to limit the means
by which labor can inflict cost on management.
When dissecting arbitration, it follows that its
foundation is built on the rudimentary principle of
bargaining in "good faith." Using this "good faith"
concept, at least in the public sector, tends to increase
or at least does not diminish substantially the negotiating
power of federal employees, therefore giving credence to the
claim that arbitration does not "cost" and is probably a
"benefit" to federal employees. [Harrison, 1979]
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To prove that this "benefit" is a valid tool, an
investigation of the distribution of outcomes must be
accomplished. This investigation would compare the dis-
puting parties' level of issue submissions (goals) with
actual goal attainment (i.e., award winners and award losers)
[Feville, 1979] Also, more specifically, to prove or measure
the benefit relationship of arbitration as a guardian of
employee interest, one may compare how arbitration has
impacted on wage demands in the public sector as compared
to the private sector. [Anderson, 1981; Anon, 1975]
3 . Arbitration as a Regulator of Interest Group
Conflict"
Arbitration impacts on interest group conflict, and
this impact affects a much broader political base than is
considered "normal" and, of course, the narrower perspective
of simple labor-management relations. The point of view
that arbitration is a useful took in regulating conflict
seems valid. Unionization of public employees highlighted
claims upon scarce public resources. [Updegraff, 1970]
This is not to say that these claims against public resources
did not already exist; but it is to say that unionization
brought them to the public eye in a very dramatic manner.
Collective bargaining increased labor-management confronta-
tion and arbitration, or third party impasse resolution, in
practice, relieved inter/intra-organization pressures caused
by that confrontation. [Updegraff, 1970]

Arbitration perforins this regulatory benefit func-
tion through proven impartiality of award decisions,
compromising and face saving techniques. As a result of the
inherent attributes of arbitration, the process will absorb
those interest group pressures that might otherwise cause
serious disruptions. [Feville, 1979]
Empirical testing of this function is extremely
difficult and can be considered a quantitative output only
by those who place a high judgmental value on potential
stability.
C. COST CRITERIA
The cost criteria are established by looking at two
non-physical yields, but are explained, measured, and evalu-
ated by two rational phenomena. These phenomena can be
related to physical outputs. The cost criteria are
summarized in Figure 7.1.
1. Arbitration as an Inhibitor of Representative
Government
The arbitration process, as presently enforced, can
be considered contrary to the American political system of
a representative democratic government. This premise is
based on the idea that labor and political systems alike should
be structured to reflect the will of the governed. This
inhibitor function countermands the notion of accountability
for public decisions and increases bureaucratic insulation


















































































Figure 7.1 Benefit-Cost o£ Arbitration
In other words, arbitration allows the allocation of
public resources by a non-elected third party, who is not
directly responsible for his decisions. It also intensifies
bureaucratic control by labor professionals over govern-
mental employee -employer relations.
2. Arbitration as an Inhibitor of Genuine Bargaining
Arbitration can have a costly impact on the incen-
tive to bargain in "good faith." This concept is based upon
the premise that collective bargaining is a valuable tool
and should be protected. Arbitration may be too easily used
as an escape device from having the parties make difficult
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trade-off choices among disputed issues. It would be a
simple matter to forfeit the bargaining obligation to third
party resolution as either party normally can invoke arbi-
tration if it feels it to be to its advantage. [Feville,
1979]
D. ARBITRATION RESULTANT PHENOMENA
As mentioned above, two by-products that can be evaluated
are realized. The evaluation of these by-products helps
determine if the non-quantifiable costs, as pointed out in
the section on cost criteria, are legitimate in nature.
1. The Impact of the "Chilling Effect"
The "chilling effect" comes about as the result of
compulsory arbitration in the federal sector. [Feville,
1979] Under this concept, genuine negotiation efforts are
inhibited as the disputing parties hold back concessions in
anticipation of submitting the issues to an arbitrator.
It poses this problem because labor and management alike
understand that arbitration is a compromising process and
they ask themselves why they (either party) should concede
on any of the issues if an arbitrator tends to split the
difference between the union and management position.
[Anderson, 1981; Feville, 1979] It predicates the philoso-
phy that any concession or compromise prior to arbitration




The hypothesis that the "chilling effect" is signifi
cant may be examined by sampling the percentage of negotia-
tion issues settled at each stage of the bargaining
procedure. The higher the percentage settled at arbitra-
tion, the greater the "chilling effect" impact. This impact
is a cost directly to the collective bargaining system as
conceived. Also, by assessing the amount of compromising
activity by both parties and the reduction of total issues
remaining at the point of impasse, some measure indicating
the presence and impact of the cost function is achieved.
2. The Impact of the "Narcotic Effect"
This phenomenon stems from the premise that dis-
puting parties, over time, may come to rely solely on
impasse resolution (arbitration) to settle all negotiations
between them. Disputing parties see very little or no
benefit from resolving by, or at least devoting the enormous
time required to, the collective bargaining process when a
third party can resolve the disputed issues more quickly
and in a satisfactory, if not desirable, fashion. [Feville,
1979]
The presence and impact of this "effect" should be
indicated by a rise over time in the proportion of cases
going to final arbitration.
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E. EVALUATION OF SELECTIVE COSTS AND BENEFITS
1. Evaluation of Arbitration as Guardian of the
Public's Interest
Public service agencies are virtually strike free
institutions. [CSRA, 1978] This gives those agencies a
substantial benefit over private institutions where striking
is considered part of the collective bargaining process.
[Anon, 19 75]
The air-controller strike is a good example as to
the benefit of an "illegal to strike" law dealing with
public services. The air-controller strike cost tax payers
millions of dollars in service, thousands of dollars in
negotiation costs and untold inconvenience and safety.
These costs would be part of an enormous recurring expense
if strikes occurred more often in the public sector;
presumably strikes would be more frequent if arbitration
were not compulsory.
Comparing this situation with private industry, it
seems that the costs incurred from strikes are isolated in
nature and do not affect the enormous proportion of the
population that a strike against an agency performing public
services would.
Arbitration tends to produce benefits when investi-
gated as a guardian of public interest although there seems
to be a cost associated with the lack of the right to strike
in public employment and this will be discussed later.
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2. Arbitration as a Guardian of the Employee's Interest
This benefit could be measured by investigating the
distribution of the outcomes of grievance issues. Issues,
for administrative purposes, are normally divided into cate-
gories (i.e., general, economic, etc.). [FMCS, 1981] The
economic category includes issues dealing with wages and
pay, fringe benefits and severance pay. The investigation
of the distribution of outcomes compared the federal employ-
ee's goal attempts with goal attainments for economic issues
going to arbitration. Simply put, it is the ratio of award
winners to award losers.
Pro labor awards had been handed down 46 percent of
the time during this period. [FMCS, 1981] This single
statistic, although simplistic, indicates that employee
rights are being seriously considered and acted upon and
that arbitration does give fair consideration to the benefit
of the federal employee.
Anon states that earnings and fringe benefits of
public employees in the Federal Government are catching up
and surpassing those in the private sector. [1975] This is
a tangible indicator that arbitration is working as a benefit
to the federal employee. This raises the question that if
this is such a good benefit to the federal employee then
who is it costing. This issue will be addressed later.
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F. THE MEASUREMENT OF THE "NARCOTIC" AND "CHILLING" EFFECTS
1. The "Narcotic Effect"
As previously discussed one indication of the
presence of this effect would be a growth in the fraction
of mediation cases reaching arbitration over time. Figure 7.2
lists the cases arbitrated each year starting with 1976 and
ending in 1980. As shown by Figure 7.2, the number of cases
being handled at the arbitration level has been increasing
and so has the proportion of total mediation cases.
Year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
1°^^] 5,550 6,935 8,155 7,025 7,539
uas e s
Fraction
Reaching .26 .26 .36 .30 .31
Arbitration
[FMCS, 1981]
Figure 7.2 Total Arbitration Award Cases
Closed: FY 1976-1980
The arbitration process handled an average annual
case load of 7040.8 with a total increase over the five-year
period of approximately 36 percent. This alone proves
nothing, but if compared to the total cases being handled
at the mediation phase, it is noted that this increase is
not simply due to a total increase in cases alone.
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The level of mediation activity (case load handled
during the mediation phase of collective bargaining) is
depicted below in Figure 7.3.
Year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
l^lll 21,179 25,882 22,882 23,142 24,178Lias 6 s
[FMCS, 1981]
Figure 7.3 Total Mediation Cases Closed: FY 1976-1980
The mediation activity for the five-year period
averaged some 23,575.6 cases annually with a total growth of
14 percent, compared to the 36 percent growth in number of
cases reaching arbitration over this period. In 1976, 26
percent of the mediation cases reached arbitration; in 1980
31 percent did. Clearly, a larger proportion of disputes
are now being referred to binding arbitration for settle-
ment. It seems reasonable that the growth be attributed to
the "narcotic effect" and thus indicates a direct cost to
the collective bargaining process.
2. The "Chilling Effect "
The total number of cases does not tell the whole
story. The number of issues being negotiated within those
cases must also be examined to see if there has been an
increase or decrease in that measure.
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Figure 7.4 depicts issue activity from 1976 through
1980, number of issues mediated and number and fraction of
those issues settled at arbitration
Year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Total
Arbitration 6,855 6,935 8,155 8,270 8,482
Issues
Total
Mediation 42,485 50,816 46,734 49,523 49,569
Issues
Fraction .16 .14 .17 .17 .17
[FMCS, 1981]
Figure 7.4 Arbitration Issue Activity: FY 1976-1980
The information provided by the above table indicates
that the fraction of issues settled at arbitration remained
almost constant at approximately 17 percent. This statistic
indicates that about the same fraction of issues were being
handled proportionally by arbitration as total number of
issues increased over time.
When analyzing these two cost phenomena, the data
supports the position that proportionally the number of
cases reaching arbitration has increased relative to those
being settled in the other phases of the collective bargain-
ing process. While proportionally, the number of issues
reaching arbitration relative to those being settled at prior
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collective bargaining proceedings have remained constant
as a fraction of issues reaching mediation, the proportional
increase in cases and constant level of issues being settled
at arbitration indicates a strong and substantial cost being
incurred and seems to support the "narcotic," but not the
"chilling," cost effects as being substantially present.
G. IMPACT OF ARBITRATION ON WAGES
Anon says that bargaining in the federal government is
not a two-sided affair as in private industry. He continues
with the following statement:
It's multilateral bargaining. You have got several
actors on the management side. It's tough to get a
consensus on any issue. [1975]
This problem is compounded by the fact that government
labor relations are intertwined with politics and that nego-
tiators have a political image to consider. [Anon, 1975]
This thesis will not cover all political costs and
benefits of the political influence of arbitration awards
but will cover those dealing with wage scales. Anon states
that it is generally accepted that in many instances,
binding arbitration provides employees with higher benefits
at less cost (to the employee) than allowing the employees
the right to strike. [1975] This indicates a cost to the




For the tax payer, Charles R. Perry states that it may
be better to allow strikes, sacrifice the convenience of
uninterrupted service, and by that tactic negotiate from a
power position to hold down wages. [1974]
Since the legal formation of public unions, there has
been an increasing push for wage parity between private and
public workers. This is substantiated by FY 1980 's thirty-
third annual report by the Federal Mediation and Conciliatory
Service. This report indicates that there had been an
increase of 7 percent in submission of wage grievance issues
during FY 1973 and 1977 and that those submissions then
remained fairly constant as a fraction of total issues
submitted FY 1978 through 1980. [1981]
It should be noted that there was an actual drop in
those issues between the years 1979-1980 and this was the
only decrease over the period examined although the general
upward trend of 1978-1980 (up 6 percent in two years)
appeared significantly less than the trend for 1975-1978
(up 41 percent in three years). Without further data, one
cannot say whether the upward trend was broken, presumably
because governmental employees were becoming satisfied with
their pay-scale and because private -governmental wage parity
has been accomplished, or whether it was merely an accident
with the upward trend to start again.
Figure 7.5 provides the historical data on the total









1977 1978 1979 1980
992 1,026 1,120 1,091
.17 .17 .19 .18
[FMCS, 1981]
Figure 7.5 Economic, Wage and Pay Activity: FY 1975-1980
The question of wage parity between private and public
employees is addressed by the statistics published in the
report by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations in 1975. Figure 7.6 displays the Commission's
findings.









Figure 7.6 Private-Public Wage Statistics: FY 1955-1973
The data depicted in Figure 7.6 indicates that private
industry has not experienced as high a rate of increase in
pay as the federal sector, and partly confirms that
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arbitration does not inhibit the accomplishment of wage
parity between the two sectors. The federal sector has
enjoyed an increase in wages that was 43.6 percent higher
than the increase in the private sector during the period
1955-1973 and it follows that arbitration may have played
a significant role in providing this benefit to the federal
labor force.
Fringe benefits further complicate evaluating arbitra-
tion's effect on wage comparisons, but in government,
workers generally receive superior benefits. The difference
in pensions is especially dramatic. Public workers generally
enjoy larger benefits and are able to take advantage of them
earlier than workers in private industry. [Anon, 1975]
To summarize, arbitration appears to have positively
affected wage parity between the private and public sectors.
This is shown by the large increase in the economic issue
category from 1973 to 1976 and then the breaking of the
increasing trend or the tapering off of those types of
grievances between 1977 and 1978. This tapering off possibly
indicates to some degree satisfaction by public employees
with the wage and pay issue. The benefit to public employees
is further evidenced by the statistics provided by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations which
stated substantial gains in wage parity.
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H. COST OF THE ARBITRATOR
Arbitration has been criticized because of the growing
cost of the arbitrator himself. [Ingrassia, 1979] Figures
7.7 and 7.8 provide cost data on days charged to arbitration
and related expenses and fees.
Year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Travel Days .32 .33 .31 .33 .33
Hearing Days .89 .87 .99 .99 1.00
Study Days 1.67 1.76 1.78 1.82 1.88
Total 2.80 2.96 3.09 3.14 3.21
[FMCS, 1981]
Figure 7.7 Average Number of Days Charged
per Arbitration: FY 1976-1980
Dollar
Amount
Year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Fees 581.72 644.70 735.53 804.57 883.59
Expenses 80.76 88.34 95.00 107.31 128.15
Total 662.39 773.04 830.54 911.83 1,011.74
Total in
Constant 501.43 524.35 553.32 560.09 570.32
1972 $
[FMCS, 1981; USDC, 1981]
Figure 7.8 Average Fees and Expenses
per Arbitration: FY 1976-1980
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Figure 7.9 provides a convenient summary trend line













Figure 7.9 Days, Fees and Expenses
Charged Summary
These statistics indicate an increase of 14.6 percent in
days charged and an increase of 52.7 percent average total
expenses charged over the five-year period. It should be
noted that the annual average increase in expenses of 11.2
percent was more than inflation (there was real growth) for
the same time period and the average annual growth was
3 percent.
I . SUMMARY
This chapter attempted to analyze the more significant
costs and benefits of arbitration. Many could not be
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quantified but at least an indication o£ direction of change
in magnitude could be estimated by examining data which it
is plausible to assume was highly correlated to the actual
costs/benefits. Overall it was concluded that arbitration
advocates can point to three major benefits that arbitration
might provide while skeptics could emphasize two sets of
cost that might be imposed by these procedures.
The most visible rationale for arbitration has been
perceived as the need to protect the public from the with-
drawal of supposedly vital public services (although such
perceptions seem to be based on little or no empirical
evidence). It is generally accepted that arbitration helps
accomplish this strike -prevention objective and is a benefit
in that respect to the public-at-large.
It is concluded that arbitration protects the interest
of the public employee by providing him a viable vehicle
for fair and objective grievance settlement. The direction of
wage growth seems to indicate the existence of benefits
being derived from the collective bargaining process of
which arbitration is playing an ever-increasing role. It is
noted that although wage parity is being accomplished it is
uncertain whether the wage and pay growth in the federal
sector can be directly tied to arbitration. It follows that
arbitration probably causes a cost to the tax paying public
in the form of increased wages to federal workers. This
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cost is undeterminable from the data investigated in this
thesis.
The presence of the "narcotic" effect could not be
absolutely proven, but the indicator used to measure its
effect inferred its presence. This presence and the asso-
ciated effects have increased both the normative and opera-
tional expense in the arbitration area (i.e., the cost to
the tax payer in direct representation for indirect alloca-
tion of public funds and fees and expenses of the
arbitrator)
.
The presence of the hypothetical "chilling" effect or
of its substantive influence upon the collective bargaining
process in the federal government could not be confirmed.
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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This thesis provided an information guide covering those
events leading up to and during the arbitration process and
examined certain selected costs and benefits associated with
arbitration in the public sector. More specifically, the
guide has presented information on such topics as the legal
relationship between arbitration and the rights and duties
of employees, managers, federal agencies and labor organiza-
tions in complying with legal restraints imposed by the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.
An attempt was made to fill an information gap at the
mid-manager level. The guide discusses the "arbitrability"
of grievance issues, the selection of an arbitrator, and
case preparation and presentation.
In some instances this thesis provided a systematic
investigation using techniques that required establishing
cost and benefit criteria using quantifiable measurements
when possible and descriptive evaluation of related data
when physical outputs were not available.
The cost and the benefit of a program can be seen from
many different perspectives; what is a cost to one is a
benefit to another. Arbitration has both rewards and cost
to both the tax paying public and the public employees who
use the process as part of the collective bargaining system.
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Since the formation of federal unions, conflict has existed
between management and labor. Arbitration safeguards
employee interest by providing a means of grievance
settlement that is in "good faith" and awards by neutral
third parties, and safeguards public interest by providing
a vehicle that resolves conflict without strikes or public
service interruptions. There is a lot of give and take in
the explanation of these costs and benefits as that in many
instances the costs and benefits overlap. No fine line is
drawn and it seems to be a matter of relative degree as to
what point the costs outweigh the benefits and who should
pay the costs and who should reap the benefits.
Two phenomena or by-products resulting from arbitration
were identified as means to measure the degree of costs
associated with the collective bargaining process with
varying degrees of impact. Those by-products, the "chilling
effect" and the "narcotic effect" are not precise measure-
ments but their trends can be inferred from other, indirect,
measurements. The conclusions were that over time the frac-
tion of cases reaching arbitration has increased. From this
it was inferred the "narcotic effect" was significant,
therefore indicating an impact or cost to the collective
bargaining process. That cost is an inhibition of the use
of the pre-arbitration phases for grievance settlement. The
impact of the "chilling effect" was inconclusive since the
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number of issues reaching arbitration in proportion to those
being settled at the pre-arbitration level remained almost
constant. These two measurable phenomena counter-balance
each other to some extent. Although the total number o£
cases is rising, the issues reaching arbitration are the
more complex problems that normal grievance procedures have
been unable to handle.
One selected area investigated was the wage and pay
category of issues. This area was identified for scrutiny
as it proved to be the more convenient supply of information
available. The study attempted to tie the trend of public
employee wages to compulsory arbitration. It is clear that
the gap between the public and private sectors has been
narrowed in recent years. This evaluation addressed the
questions of whether compulsory arbitration inhibits the
earning power of public employees and whether the tax payer
benefits by having a third party allocate public resources
without direct representation. The evaluation of relative
wage growth of public and private sectors during the period
of compulsory arbitration led to the conclusion that, in
fact, arbitration may have enhanced federal employees'
chances for greater wage rates than their private counter-
parts. Not only have the wages of public employees increased
faster over the period investigated but this increase has
come at less cost to the individual employee. This is
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explained by the fact that when private employees strike it
costs them in the form of wages and benefits lost during
the strike period. The net gain would then be the difference
between the gains achieved by striking and those lost by
the same action. The absence of the "right" to strike in
the public sector lends no opportunity for such cost to be
incurred by the public employee and therefore his net
gain over time has been substantially greater. Though the
public employees' gain has been greater so has the cost of
those gains been greater to the tax paying public. As noted,
from 1955 to 1973, wage and pay in the federal government
increased 182.9 percent while private industry increased
only 129.3 percent during this period.
It is possible that the wage increase statistics are
misleading in that the big gains by public workers are repre-
sentative of a "catch-up" from historically depressed wages.
Yet another indication of "relative" gains in the public
sector is that over a period when there was considerable
pressure to reduce civil service, it actually increased by
5.4 percent, totaling about 4 percent of the total workforce
by 1975. [BLS, 1978] It follows that wages paid or offered
to potential federal workers were in line and competitive
with those being offered in non-public jobs. This statistic
cannot be directly tied to arbitration but infers the absence




The cost of the arbitrator is a measurable output and
requires attention when deciding to carry a case to arbitra-
tion. The arbitrator's costs have increased at an annual
average rate of 11.2 percent (in current dollars). This
11.2 percent is above the inflation rate realized during the
same time period and, although these costs are and should be
inhibited, they are increasing at a rate of only 3 percent
annually in real dollars.
This research seems to support the following conclusions:
First, the existence of arbitration in the public sector has
not eliminated bargaining, for the majority of cases (70
percent) and issues (83 percent) are settled in the pre-
arbitration phases of the collective bargaining process.
Second, on the other hand, there seems to be an increasing
dependence, both in labor and management alike, on arbitra-
tion for grievance settlement as shown by the increase in
proportion of cases going to arbitration. Third, arbitra-
tion seemingly has the characteristic of being a "satisfier"
in that it appears to provide political and social stability
within the public workforce while, fourth, accomplishing an
essential goal of protecting the rights of federal employees.
Fifth, the contribution that arbitration makes toward
protecting these rights, including economic issues, has
an associated cost to the tax payer in the form of increasing
pay and benefits for those same public workers. The total
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cost to government, associated with arbitration, appears to be
rising in total dollars spent; but, from the data evaluated,
it cannot be determined if those costs outweigh the benefits
derived.
Perhaps the most important conclusion that can be drawn
from these results is that compulsory arbitration is likely
to subvert and attenuate collective bargaining if disputing
parties view that process as the least costly alternative
for resolving grievance issues.
A. SUGGESTION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The results of this paper suggest the existence of a
number of rewarding research topics. First, an empirical
analysis of the direct cost of arbitration to the tax payer.
Second, a detailed study of the tendency of arbitrators to
split the difference between the disputing parties' final
position. Finally, an analysis of the degree to which
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